Court Always Retains Ability to Modify Alimony and Alimony Award Can Never Exceed the Recipients Needs

Sellers v. Sellers, 2010 UT App 393 (Utah Court of Appeals December 30, 2010).

In the Decree of Divorce the trial court ordered that neither party was awarded alimony either at the time of the Decree or in the future.  Wife appealed.  Wife further appealed the finding that Husband owed no alimony.  The basis of her appeal was that the trial court made insufficient findings as to Husband’s ability to earn.  (Wife appealed on additional grounds, but failed to properly preserve those grounds at the trial level).  

The Court of Appeals determined that the regardless of the trial court’s order, the court may always modify alimony based on statute, UCA 30-3-5(8); and no divorce decree can change the statute.  As to the zero alimony award, it was shown that wife had sufficient income to meet her needs and did not qualify for alimony; the Court need not determine a party’s ability to pay if the other party’s needs are already being met.  “Regardless of the ability of the payor spouse to pay more, the recipient souse’s need must constitute the maximum permissible alimony award.”

Full Decision available at  http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/appopin/sellers123010.pdf

Alimony Must be Based on Sufficient Findings and Alimony Cannot Exceed Needs

Fish v. Fish, 2010 UT App. 292, (Utah Court of Appeals October 21, 2010).

Wife was awarded $800 per month in alimony.  Husband appealed.  He argued that the trial court had insufficient evidence to make findings as to the parties’ ability to earn and their needs.  The Court of Appeals found that testimony alone is sufficient evidence for imputation of income, and that Husband’s enrollment in a Technical College did not preclude imputation of income.  If a party already has basic job skills, he cannot rely on the schooling to avoid the imputation of income.  However, the findings of the trial court did not support the level of income imputed to husband as required by U.C.A. 78B-12-203(7)(b) (2008).  Without such findings, the trial court cannot impute income.  Additionally, the trial court made no findings as to Husband’s ability to pay and therefore the alimony award was an abuse of discretion and reversed.  The Court also found ability to earn cannot be based on monthly income alone, but must be based on the U.C.A. 78B-12-203(7)(b) factors, reversing the trial court’s finding that wife’s ability to earn directly correlates with her current income. 

Lastly, simply because the parties combined needs exceed their combined incomes does not prove that the parties’ standard of living is not commensurate with the standard of living at the time of the marriage, it simply proves that the cost to sustain two households is greater than the cost to sustain one.

Full Decision available at http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/appopin/fish102110.pdf

Income to Which a Payor Spouse Would Receive But For His Bad Acts May Be Imputed To Him

Young v. Young, ---P.3d---, 2009 UT App. 3, (Utah Court of Appeals, January 2, 2009).

Darrel Edward Young (Husband) was incarcerated at the time he became eligible for social security benefits. Because of Husband’s incarceration for a felony conviction he was not permitted to receive his benefits. However, Willa Mae Young (Wife), Darrell’s ex-wife filed for increase in spousal support in Utah’s First District Court. Wife claimed that husband’s recent eligibility for benefits was a substantial change in circumstances and that the benefit amount that he would receive should be calculated as income. The trial court agreed and changed the spousal support from $50 to $600, based on the eligibility. Husband appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals.

The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's opinion. The Court found that the receipt of retirement benefits or social security can constitute a change in circumstances sufficient for a modification. Additionally, but for husband’s bad acts leading to his incarceration, he would receive the Social Security benefit. Lastly, based on the Husband’s imputed income and now the new income that he would be receiving from Social Security, his income is now 70% of the parties’ gross income and as such he was ordered to pay 70% of the combined attorney fees.

Full Decision available at http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/appopin/young010209.pdf