Ongoing Cohabitation Not a Requirement to Prove Common Law Marriage

Richards v. Brown, 2012 UT 14, March 13, 2012

Richards and Brown were never married.  Richards attempted to prove the existence of a common law marriage.  The trial court found that Richards had failed to prove the existence of an unsolemnized marriage within the 1-year statute of repose because Richards failed to file the action within one year of his cohabitation with Brown.  Richards appealed.  See Richards v. Brown, 2009 App. UT 315.  The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and found that Richards was not necessarily time barred and that while the cohabitation may have ended more than a year before filing, the Court failed to make sufficient findings that the underlying relationship ended more than one year prior to the filing of the action.  Brown Appealed.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and sent the case back to trial court to determine when a triggering event occurred. The statue of repose begins to run only when one of the parties: stops assuming marital rights, duties, and obligations; stops holding himself or herself out as the spouse of the other party; or loses legal capacity.  Termination of cohabitation does not necessarily trigger the statute of repose.

Full opinion available at: http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/supopin/Richards031312.pdf

Common Law Marriage: Ongoing Cohabitation Not a Requirement of Common Law Marriage

Richards v. Brown, 2009 UT App. 315, (Utah Court of Appeals, October 29, 2009).

Common Law Marriage. The trial court summarily denied Richard’s petition to recognize a common law marriage because more than one year had passed since the parties cohabitated. Richards appealed. The Court found cohabitation is not an ongoing requirement. If the parties continued to assume rights, duties, and obligation, of the marriage, and continued to hold themselves out as married, the relationship continues. A party may file to have the relationship recognized anytime during the relationship, or within one year. The Court reversed and remanded this claim and instructed the trial court to hear evidence as to the termination date of the relationship.

Unjust enrichment. Richards must show that Brown benefited from payments, which he made to her, and that failure to compensate him is inequitable. The record showed that the payments were commensurate with rents, thus no damages to him and no unjust benefit to him Affirmed.

Promissory Estoppel. Richards must show that he acted prudently and that Brown knew of his reliance on the promise to share the equity. Brown refinanced the home twice without adding him to the title; this notified him that she had no plans share the equity. Richards still had a place to live at a reasonable price. Affirmed.

Protective Order. Richards argued that a Discovery Protective Order prevented him from obtaining needed evidence. However, Richards filed a Certificate of Readiness in which he acknowledged that discovery was complete. Based on that admission, there was no reason for further discovery. Affirmed.

Full Decision available http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/appopin/richards102909.pdf

Failure to Marshal=Dismissal; Inheritance=Separate Property; Encouragement≠Enhancement; Repository≠Comingling; Forgery=Unjust Enrichment;

Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App. 233, (Utah Court of Appeals, August 27, 2009).

Prior to the case analysis, the Court summarized the marshaling requirement. In short, when marshaling the evidence the appellant must provide all evidence in support of the trial court’s ruling, and then must identify which evidence carries the “fatal flaw.” Failure marshal results in dismissal. When reviewing the property distribution, the Court that although husband had encouraged wife to wait for a better offer on her inherited stock (which resulted more money for wife), such encouragement was not sufficient enhancement to overcome the separate property presumption on inheritance. Similarly, placing of proceeds from the sale of stock into a marital account does not automatically change separate property into marital property. Particularly if the property is adequately traced out and removed from the joint account. Husband forged several checks drawn against the stock account and could not prove that he was not unjustly enriched (because he cashed the checks without wife’s permission, the trial court inferred that he was enriched). Finally, Husband requested payment of his attorney fees. Wife argued that he had no need because his family had paid for his attorney (in divorce, to be entitled to attorney fees, one must show need, the other’s ability to pay, and reasonableness of the fees). The trial court agreed with Wife, however it made inadequate findings. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded this issue. Moreover, the appellate court directed that the trial court found need and ability to pay, the court need only find what award would be reasonable, not that the fees incurred are reasonable.

Full Decision available at http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/appopin/kimball082709.pdf