In a Protective Supervision Case, Court Not Required to Provide Strict Procedural Due Process
K.D. v. State, In Re C.F., 2012 UT App 10, January 12, 2012

Children were removed by DCFS.  Legal and physical custody were later returned to Father.  The Juvenile Court retained Protective Supervision (PSS) case with the family.  While the PSS case continued, the children were exposed to a domestic violence incident involving Father and Mother.  Based on that incident, the court removed the children and set a hearing on Father’s motion for reunification services.  The juvenile court indicated no other purpose beyond addressing Father’s motion.  At that hearing, the Juvenile Court denied reunification services and at trial, terminated Father’s parental rights.  Father appealed.

The Court of Appeals found that because the court’s jurisdiction had not ended and had not modified the finding of neglect, Father was not entitled to a specific hearing on the permanency goal.  Father had a permanency hearing prior to custody being returned.  The hearing on Father’s motion fulfilled all statutory due process requirements because Father was able to present evidence and challenge the State’s allegations.  Further, because the Court maintained jurisdiction, Father was on notice that the goal for the children and custody of the children could be modified by court without further notice.  Affirmed.

Full opinion available at: http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/appopin/AMDJV_kf011212.pdf

DCFS Guidelines Are Neither Administrative Rules Nor Statute

K.Y. v. DCFS, (Utah Court of Appeals November 26, 2010).

Juvenile Court found K.Y., a teacher, neglected the student according to DCFS Guidelines’ definition of emotional maltreatment.  The teacher taped the student’s wrists to her desk with a six inch piece of scotch tape for two minutes as a method of discipline.

 

The Guidelines were neither promulgated as rules nor codified in statute and as such were neither rules nor statute and do not have the force of law.  The Juvenile Court based its entire ruling on only the DCFS guidelines, and never considered the statutory definitions of abuse or neglect.

 

The Court of Appeals found that K.Y.’s actions did not meet the statutory definition of neglect.  Additionally, there was insufficient evidence for any finding of abuse, and the JV court did not evaluate whether the teacher’s actions were a form of reasonable discipline.

In short, the JV Court did not use the correct analysis.  Under the correct analysis, K.Y.’s actions were neither neglect nor abuse.  The ruling of the JV court is Reversed.

Full Decision available at  http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/appopin/JV_ky112610.pdf

Again, Fault is Not a Factor in Alimony, and Failure to Preserve = Wavier

Fairbanks v. Fairbanks, 2010 UT 31, (Utah Court of Appeals, February 11, 2010).

Husband and wife were divorced Court awarded Wife alimony and her premarital property. Husband appealed. 

Husband argued that he too had made premarital contributions and the trial court did not compensate him.  The Court of Appeals found that Husband failed to preserve this issue and refused to consider any arguments on this issue. 

Alimony.  Husband also argued that Wife should not have awarded alimony based on her fault in the breakdown of the marriage.  The Court disagreed with husband and affirmed the trial court, finding that fault is not a factor in awarding alimony (because the legislature has not defined it).  Further, the Court found that if fault was a factor, Wife had insufficient fault in this case.  Specifically (1) Wife’s refusal to engage in sexual relations after  Husband to her he felt like he had been raped was not cruel treatment; (2) because the parties mutually agreed that Wife would move, there was no desertion; and (3) Wife’s failure to give Husband financial support because she had no surplus does not qualify as neglect.

Husband argued that the trial court improperly admitted evidence.  The Court of Appeals made no ruling on these issues because Husband failed to object at the time the evidence was offered at trial, and thereby, waived any objection.

Concurrence: We should consider fault as a factor, but since we rely on precedent, we cannot consider it.

Full Decision available at http://www.utcourts.gov/opinions/mds/fairbanks021110.pdf